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Horizontal Mergers and Exit in Declining Industries 
Abstract: 
Previous work on exit in declining industries has neglected mergers. We examine a simple model 
that predicts which declining industries experience horizontal mergers. Mergers are more likely 
if 1) market concentration is high; 2) the inverse demand curve is steep at high levels of output 
and flat at low levels of output; and 3) the industry declines slowly early on and rapidly later on. 
The conditions that make mergers privately profitable also tend to make them socially optimal. 
We test the model using U.S. manufacturing industries that declined during 1975-1995 and find 
some empirical support. 
 
JEL Codes: L10: Market Structure, Firm Strategy, and Market Performance; G34: Mergers and 
Acquisitions; L41: Antitrust Policy, Horizontal Anitcompetitive Practices 
 






Interest in declining industries was sparked by Harrigan (1980), who analyzed several 
declining industries and provided a taxonomy of strategic behavior in such settings. Since 
Harrigan’s study, several game theorists have developed models to analyze exit behavior in 
declining industries (Ghemawat and Nalebuff, 1985, 1990; Reynolds, 1988; Whinston, 1988; 
Londregan, 1990; and King, 1998). However, most work to date focuses on a limited range of 
strategic behavior – firms either reduce capacity incrementally or shut down entirely. The 
analysis of other possible strategies, such as exit through mergers or acquisitions, has been 
neglected.
1 
The goal of this paper is to incorporate the possibility of horizontal mergers (mergers 
between competitors) into a model of exit from a declining industry in order to predict which 
industries experience mergers. To do this in a simple way, in Section 2 we extend the basic 
duopoly model of Ghemawat and Nalebuff (1985) to allow for mergers. Though simple, our 
model provides insight into consolidation and the order of exit. Interestingly, the conditions that 
make mergers privately profitable also tend to make them socially optimal. 
The model generates falsifiable hypotheses about which declining industries experience 
mergers.
2 Mergers are more likely if 1) market concentration is high; 2) the inverse demand 
curve is steep at high levels of output and flat at low levels of output; and 3) the industry declines 
slowly early on and rapidly later on. Result 1 can be tested directly. Results 2 and 3 imply that 
mergers are more likely when quantity reductions early on in the declining period are associated 
                                                 
1 One exception is Dutz (1989), who uses a Cournot-style model with linear demand and capacity constraints to 
analyze how the profitability and welfare implications of horizontal mergers are affected by the level of the intercept 
of the demand curve pre and post-merger. 
2 Much of the empirical work on declining industries has also neglected mergers (Baden-Fuller, 1989; Lieberman, 
1990; Deily, 1991). One exception is Schary (1989), who finds that firm characteristics are insufficient for 




with larger increases or smaller decreases in price, while quantity reductions later on in the 
declining period are associated with smaller increases or larger decreases in price. In Section 3 
we test these hypotheses using data on four-digit SIC code U.S. manufacturing industries that 
declined during 1975-1995. The results provide some empirical support for the model. 
2. The Model 
In this section we develop a simple duopoly model of exit from a declining industry. The 
model extends the model developed by Ghemawat and Nalebuff (1985) to allow for mergers. 
There are two firms, L and S. Firm L has capacity KL and firm S has capacity KS, where KL > KS. 
Both firms have the same unit cost of capacity c. Production is all or nothing, so each period 
each firm must produce at capacity or exit the market. Once a firm exits reentry is not possible.
3 
The inverse demand at time t depends on the total industry output (which is identical to 
the industry capacity) and an industrial decline function g(t) that determines how much demand 
has declined. Assume that g(0) = 0 and that g(t) is an increasing function – this implies that 
when time increases, the inverse demand function decreases. If both firms are in the market 
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in declining industries. In a broader study of corporate restructuring, Mitchell and Mulherin (1996) find that industry 
sales shocks (positive and negative) are related to merger activity. 
3 The analysis of cyclical industries, where demand is expected to eventually rise again, would be much more 
complicated because it would be important to allow for new entrants. Gowrisankaran (1999) begins to address these 




Assume that a – f(KL+KS) = c. This implies that if both firms are in the market at time 0 then 
both earn zero profits. Because demand declines from then on, if both firms stay in the market 
then both earn losses. Therefore one must exit. After one firm exits, the other earns monopoly 
profits until it, too, exits. Given that c = a – f(KL+KS), the monopolist’s profit function is 
. )] ( ) ( ) ( [ ) ( i S L i i K K K f K f t g t + + − − = π       ( 4 )  
 
Expression (4) shows that profits, and therefore behavior, depend on only three things in the 
model: the firms’ capacities, the curvature of the inverse demand function as determined by f(.), 
and the shape of the decline function. 
The monopolist exits when its profit falls to zero. By equation (4) this occurs when 
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Inverse equation (5) to obtain 
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where ti is the period when firm i exits. Because KL > KS  and g(.) is an increasing function, the 
large firm’s exit period is before the small firm’s: tL < tS. 
If mergers are not possible, then the model is a special case of the model described by 
Ghemawat and Nalebuff (1985). Ghemawat and Nalebuff (1985) show that in the unique 
subgame perfect Nash equilibrium (SPNE) the large firm exits first. The intuition for why this 
occurs is that when demand declines the small firm can last longer as a monopoly than the large 
firm. Recognizing this, the large firm does not get involved in a war of attrition it knows it 
cannot win – it exits immediately.
4 
                                                 
4 Of course, if the large firm is large because it is more efficient than the small firm, the large firm may be able to 
outlast the small firm (see Fudenburg and Tirole (1986), for example). Several other authors have also concluded 
that small firms may have an advantage in declining industries (see Reynolds, 1988; Ghemawat and Nalebuff, 1990; 




Note that Ghemawat and Nalebuff’s result does not refer to which firm is more profitable 
as a monopoly – the argument relies only on which firm can last longer. It is possible that 
cumulative industry profit over the declining period is higher if the small firm exits first. In this 
case, if mergers are permitted and transactions costs are sufficiently low, the large firm prefers to 
buy the small firm in period 0 and shut it down. That is, consolidation occurs when the large 
firm’s value as a monopoly is greater than that of the small firm. 
   The model yields a simple inequality that determines whether mergers occur. To derive 
this condition, the large and small firms’ values as monopolists must be computed. Integrate the 
profit function (eq. (4)) from period 0 to the firms’ exit period ti: 
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where PL = a – f(KL) (P(0) when L is a monopolist); PS = a – f(KS) (P(0) when S is a 
monopolist); and P = a – f(KL+KS) (P(0) when both firms are in the market). 
The large firm buys the small firm if VL/VS > 1. This condition holds if 
.
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Inequality (11) determines whether consolidation occurs. Partial derivatives show that mergers 
are more likely when KL, PL – P, G(tS), and tL are high and KS, PS – P, G(tL), and tS are low. In 
the following paragraphs we describe restrictions on the capacities, f(.), and g(.) that make these 
conditions hold. Our goal is to formulate testable hypotheses about conditions that lead to 
mergers in declining industries. 
First, inequality (11) is more likely to hold when KL is high and KS is low. This suggests a 
testable hypothesis: 
 
Result 1: Mergers are more likely in declining industries that are more concentrated. 
 
We test this hypothesis below. The theoretical literature on horizontal mergers supports the claim 
that concentration makes mergers more profitable, and therefore more likely (Salant, Switzer, 
and Reynolds, 1983; Deneckere and Davidson, 1985; and Perry and Porter, 1985). Our model 
shows that this claim applies to declining industries as well. Barriers to entry and expansion are 
also important – empirical work on collusion shows that large market shares of the colluding 
group combined with barriers to entry and expansion make central coordination more likely to 
occur (Filson et al. 2001). Here we have assumed that since the industry is declining there is no 
entry or expansion. 
The second condition is that inequality (11) is more likely to hold when PL – P is high 
and PS – P is low. This condition matters because the monopolist gets the markup Pi – P – g(t) 





Result 2: Mergers are more likely in industries in which the inverse demand curve is steep at 
high levels of output and relatively flat at low levels of output (the f(.) function is convex). 
 
To see why Result 2 holds, note that if the inverse demand curve is steep at high levels of output 
then PL – P will be high. Further, if the inverse demand curve is relatively flat at low levels of 
output then PS – P will be low. Consider an extreme example where the inverse demand curve 
has a kink at (KL, PL), as shown in Figure 1. Figure 1 shows how, for a given value of PL – P, the 
degree to which the inverse demand curve flattens out at low levels of output affects PS – P. 
The third condition is that inequality (11) is more likely to hold when G(tS) and tL are 
high and G(tL) and tS are low. This suggests that the pattern of decline is important: 
 
Result 3: Mergers are more likely in markets that experience a low rate of decline early on and a 
high rate of decline later on. 
 
To see why Result 3 holds, consider an extreme case where g(t) = 0 for t < t
*, g(t
* + 1) = a – 
f(KL) and g(t
* + 2) = a – f(KS). The market does not decline until time t
*, and then it declines 
rapidly. Early on in the declining period, no decline occurs, so if firm L is a monopolist it gets 
the benefit of a high PL for several periods. Further, tL = t
* + 1 and tS = t
* + 2, so firm S gets only 
one extra period as a monopolist. If PS is very close to PL then the two firms’ markups are 
essentially the same, so if firm L is sufficiently larger than firm S then it must be the more 
profitable monopolist – firm S’s only advantage is that it lasts an extra period, but firm L’s 




This is an extreme example, but real-world decline patterns could come close to it. 
Empirical studies of technology substitution, such as Norton and Bass (1987, 1992), suggest that 
the pattern of decline in declining industries is similar to the pattern of growth in new industries: 
both can be described using S-shaped diffusion curves. The rate of decline is initially low, then it 
accelerates, and then it diminishes once decline is substantially complete. If the initial period 
with a low rate of decline is long and the period of acceleration is short then a pattern like that 
described above would occur (see Figure 2). 
Results 2 and 3 cannot be tested separately because it is not possible to distinguish the 
effects of output changes that cause movements along the inverse demand curve from the effects 
of decline that cause the curve to shift. However, taken together, the two results yield a testable 
hypothesis about when mergers are likely to occur: if the inverse demand curve is steep at high 
levels of output and the rate of decline is low initially, then we should observe a steep 
relationship between price and output early on in the declining period because the inverse 
demand curve is relatively stable. If the inverse demand curve is flat at low levels of output and 
the rate of decline is rapid later on in the declining period, then we should observe either a flat 
relationship between price and output or a positive relationship (price and output may decline 
together). Therefore, we should observe the following pattern when comparing industries: 
industries in which mergers occur should have a more negative or less positive relationship 
between price and output early on in the declining period and a less negative or more positive 
relationship later on in the declining period. We test this hypothesis below. 
Social Welfare 
 
In this subsection we show that the conditions that make mergers likely also tend to make 




monopolist. Social welfare in period t when L is a monopolist is the area under the inverse 
demand curve above c, 
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monopolist, integrate expression (12) from 0 to tL: 
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WS  is defined similarly – simply replace KL and tL with KS and tS. Given expression (13), if VL > 
VS , then a sufficient condition for WL > WS is 
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Figure 3 shows that  ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( S S S L L L K F K K f K F K K f − > − . The gap between the two 
expressions is shaded in Figure 3. Clearly the gap is increasing in the concavity of the inverse 
demand curve as determined by f(.). Therefore, a concave inverse demand curve (a convex f(.)) 
makes it more likely that a merger is socially optimal. As noted in Result 2, this is also one of the 
conditions that makes a merger privately profitable. The only way expression (14) may not hold 
is that tS may be much larger than tL, but as noted in the discussion of Result 3 this makes it less 
likely that a merger is privately profitable. Therefore, the conditions that make mergers privately 
profitable also tend to make them socially optimal. 
Oligopoly 
 
In this subsection we provide a brief analysis of mergers in the case of three firms to 




regulators do not permit a merger unless industry profit is zero and one firm is about to exit. This 
is a reasonable rule because if industry profit is positive then social welfare is increasing in total 
industry capacity so mergers that involve capacity reductions would not be permitted. On the 
other hand, if industry profit is zero then it may be desirable to allow a merger in order to 
rationalize capacity reduction. 
Given the assumption that mergers can occur only when industry profit is zero, if there 
are positive transactions costs of merging then only the largest firm in the market can find it 
optimal to purchase another firm. A smaller firm will not incur the expense to purchase the 
largest firm and shut it down because if no merger occurs the largest firm will exit on its own, 
and the smaller firm will not purchase and shut down a firm other than the largest because it is 
better off with the larger reduction in industry capacity that occurs when the largest firm exits 
(because the industry price rises more). 
Given that only the largest firm can be an acquirer, we analyze conditions under which 
the largest of three firms finds it optimal to purchase and shut down one of the smaller firms. 
Index the firms by 1, 2, and 3, where 1 is the largest and 3 is the smallest. Assume that at time 0 
industry profits are zero if all three firms are in the market. The formal analysis is quite tedious 
because a variety of cases must be considered. At time 0, firm 1 may exit, buy firm 2, or buy 
firm 3. In order to value each one of these options, future choices must be considered. For 
example, if firm 1 exits, does firm 2 buy firm 3 at some point in the future? If firm 1 buys firm 2, 
does firm 1 buy firm 3 later on? For brevity, we present a formal analysis of the simplest case in 
the appendix, and here we restrict ourselves to providing intuition. In the appendix we assume 
that firm 1 prefers exiting to buying firm 3. This implies that firm 1 compares exiting to buying 




The intuitive explanation for why Results 1-3 continue to hold in the oligopoly case is as 
follows. If firm 1 buys one of the smaller firms and shuts it down then a smaller reduction in 
industry capacity occurs than would be the case if firm 1 exited. The relative profitability of each 
option (exit, buy firm 2, buy firm 3) depends on how much price rises in each case. For example, 
if the inverse demand curve is steep when output is greater than  3 1 K K +  and relatively flat when 
output is below  3 1 K K +  then, as in the duopoly case, the markup is similar whether firm 1 or 2 
is shut down. Further, as in the duopoly case, if demand declines slowly early on then firm 1 
benefits from a high markup for several periods, and the larger firm 1’s capacity, the more units 
of output the high markup is spread over. If demand declines rapidly around the time that firm 1 
must exit then the exit periods of all of the firms are similar – the small firms do not benefit 
much from having a longer life. Thus, in the oligopoly case the three results obtained in the 
duopoly case continue to hold: mergers are more likely if firm 1 is large, the inverse demand 
curve is concave, and demand declines slowly early on and rapidly later on. 
3. Empirical Analysis 
Most of the empirical literature on declining industries uses a case study approach 
(pioneered by Harrigan, 1980, and employed by Ghemawat and Nalebuff, 1990, among others; 
Lieberman, 1990, is a notable exception). In contrast, we provide large sample results to test our 
model. There are advantages and disadvantages to our approach. An advantage is that we can be 
confident that our results are not specific to a few isolated cases. A disadvantage is that our data 
is not sufficiently detailed to examine many of the issues case studies address, such as the precise 
order of plant shutdowns. Given this, our empirical analysis focuses on the model’s testable 






  The data includes all of the four-digit SIC (Standard Industrial Classification) 
manufacturing industries in the United States that declined during the period 1975-1995.  The 
four-digit SIC code industries are used because of the availability of data on concentration ratios, 
price, quantity, and mergers. Price and output measures are from the NBER Manufacturing 
Productivity Database (Bartelsman and Gray, 1996). Industry output was calculated by dividing 
the value of shipments in each industry by its price index. After computing output, the price 
indexes were deflated using the CPI to remove economy-wide inflation, and the deflated prices 
were used to compute the statistics reported below. The market concentration ratios are from the 
Census of Manufactures. Merger data is from the Lexis-Nexis database, which allows searches 
for mergers and acquisitions by SIC code. 
From the 459 U.S. manufacturing industries in the NBER database, 104 declining 
industries were selected using the following criteria: an industry is defined as declining when the 
industry output begins declining in the 1975-85 period, declines over at least a five-year period, 
and then stays below its level at the first period of decline until at least 1995. These criteria are 
designed to exclude industries that decline due to cyclical fluctuations. 
The declining industries are classified into two groups. There are 47 industries in the “no-
merger group,” in which no horizontal mergers or acquisitions occur. There are 57 industries in 
the “merger group,” in which horizontal mergers occur. Because the theoretical model does not 
distinguish between mergers and acquisitions we do not distinguish between the two here. Firms 
in the no-merger group may be involved in vertical mergers (mergers with buyers or suppliers) 
or other types of mergers. We count only mergers between competitors that have significant 
operations in the U.S., and we include cases where a firm acquires a major division from a 




Before proceeding to the hypothesis tests we present summary statistics. Tables 1a and 1b 
summarize the declining periods and the rates of decline in the no-merger group and the merger 
group, respectively. For example, SIC code 2067, Chewing Gum, declined from 1979-1991, and 
output fell 18.7% during this period. By 1995 output had increased somewhat; output fell 6.1% 
from 1979-1995. The averages show that the average length of the declining period is higher in 
the merger group and the average rate of decline is lower in the merger group, but the differences 
are small and statistically insignificant. 
Tables 2a and 2b list the number of firms in 1977 and 1992. The Census of Manufactures 
provides firm numbers every five years, and some SIC codes change over time (see fn. 5 below). 
The numbers in Tables 2a and 2b provide a rough measure of firm numbers before and after 
decline and the net exit rate. Net exit occurs in most industries, but in some cases net entry 
occurs. This suggests that future models might explore the implications of allowing entry to 
occur during the declining period, although as we noted above in fn. 3, this would complicate the 
analysis considerably. The results in the tables show that, on average, industries with mergers 
have more firms and less exit. Although the differences in the averages are large they are 
statistically insignificant because there is a high amount of variation in firm numbers and exit 
rates within each group. 
Hypothesis Tests 
 
The first hypothesis states that mergers are more likely to occur in markets that are more 
concentrated at the beginning of the declining period. Table 3a and 3b reports the share of the 
value of shipments of the four largest, eight largest, twenty largest, and fifty largest firms in 1977 
(CR4, CR8, CR20, and CR50).
5 The results show that, on average, there is not much difference 
                                                 
5 Concentration ratios and firm numbers are available from the Census of Manufactures every five years. In a few 




between the two groups. The industries in the merger group are more concentrated using the CR4 
measure but less concentrated using the other measures, and the differences are very small and 
statistically insignificant. This appears to provide little support for the hypothesis. 
However, one fact has not been considered: antitrust officials are less likely to allow 
large firms in more concentrated industries to merge. Taking this as given, if firms in more 
concentrated industries are neither more nor less likely to attempt mergers then what we should 
expect to see in Tables 3a and 3b is that average concentration is much higher in the no-merger 
group. Attempts would be equally likely regardless of concentration but firms in more 
concentrated industries would be blocked more often. The fact that we do not observe this 
pattern in Tables 3a and 3b suggests that firms in more concentrated industries are more likely to 
attempt mergers, and this supports our hypothesis. 
The second hypothesis states that mergers are more likely to occur in industries where the 
relationship between price and quantity is more negative or less positive early on in the declining 
period and less negative or more positive later on. To test this hypothesis we look for evidence of 
a structural break in the price-output relationship during the declining period. We divide the 
declining period in each industry into two equal parts and investigate the price-output 
relationship in each part. 
First, we look for evidence that prices rise more or fall less in the early part of the 
declining period in industries where mergers occur. Tables 4a and 4b show that, on average, 
prices fall less early on in the merger group than in the no-merger group. Further, prices fall at a 
                                                                                                                                                       
information. In these cases we computed the minimum possible concentration ratio given the number of firms. In 
some other cases (SIC 2325, 2656, 2999, 3339, 3362, 3494, 3536, 3553, 3556, 3594, 3613, 3641, 3671, 3965) the 
composition of the SIC code had changed since 1977, and in those cases we computed firm numbers and 
concentration ratios using weighted averages of the old SIC codes. The weights are from the NBER web site in the 




higher rate later on in the merger group than in the no-merger group. These results support the 
hypothesis. 
To proceed further, we regress the natural log of price on the natural log of output in each 
industry in each part of the declining period. Using logs removes the impact of units of 
measurement on the results. The OLS equation is 
lpt   =    α0  + β0 lqt + εt , 
where lpt is the log of the price series, lqt is the log of the output series, α0 and β0 are 
coefficients, and εt is the error term. 
  The model predicts that changes in the steepness of the price-output curve over the 
declining period affect the likelihood of mergers. In industries where mergers occur, β0 should be 
lower early on in the declining period and higher later in the declining period, where “lower” and 
“higher” are determined relative to the industries where mergers do not occur. 
Tables 4a and 4b report the β0  coefficients from OLS regressions when the declining 
period in each industry is divided in two. The results support the hypothesis of the model. The 
average β0 over the first half of the declining period of the merger group (0.10) is lower than the 
coefficient of the no merger group (0.11), and the average β0 over the second half of the 
declining period of the merger group (0.18) is higher than the coefficient of the no merger group 
(0.078). The difference between the early coefficients is statistically insignificant, but the 
difference between the late coefficients is significant at the 5% level. 
Thus, the results suggest that the main effect driving mergers is that in the industries in 
which mergers occur, demand declines rapidly late in the declining period. In this case, small 
firms cannot survive much longer than large firms, so the large firms’ advantage from having 





This paper presents a theoretical model and an empirical analysis to investigate horizontal 
mergers in declining industries. Ghemawat and Nalebuff (1985) show that when production is 
all-or-nothing large firms exit before small firms in declining industries. Our simple extension of 
their model shows that large firms may be more valuable than small firms, and this implies that 
when mergers are allowed the large firms may buy the small ones and shut them down. The large 
and small firms’ values are determined by three factors: the firms’ capacities, the shape of the 
inverse demand function, and the rate of decline in demand (and how this rate changes over 
time). Mergers are more likely in industries where the pre-merger market is concentrated and 
where small capacity reductions early on in the declining period lead to larger increases in price. 
The empirical results conform to the model’s predictions. 
Note that the model presented here is very simple, and it cannot explain all of the 
possible reasons for merging in a declining industry. One notable absence is that we have not 
considered efficiency advantages, which cannot be measured with our data but are probably 
important (see Dutz, 1989). Introducing efficiency advantages could affect many of our results. 
For example, in our model the acquiring firm is always larger than the acquired firm, but this 
need not be the case if efficiency differences exist. A small efficient firm may choose to buy a 
large inefficient firm’s capacity in order to use the capacity more effectively. 
Future work on mergers in evolving industries could make several contributions. In 
addition to considering efficiency differences, the assumption of all-or-nothing production could 
be relaxed (as in Ghemawat and Nalebuff, 1990), and firms could be allowed to buy each other’s 
plants. Second, the analysis could consider entry and allow for the fact that while many 




allow the analysis to move beyond declining industries to consider industries at various stages in 
development. Recent work suggests that exploring how integration varies at different stages in an 
industry’s evolution would be useful: Franco and Filson (2001) show that horizontal mergers 
were an important form of exit in the disk drive industry during the 1980s and 1990s, and Filson 
(2001) shows that vertical integration occurred early in the personal computer industry’s life 
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Appendix: Formal Analysis of the Three-Firm Oligopoly 
 
Whether firm 1 prefers to exit at time 0 or buy firm 2 and shut it down depends on which firm is 
more valuable as a duopolist competing with firm 3. If firm 1 exits at time 0 then firms 2 and 3 
coexist until demand declines to the point where firm 2 must exit - denote this period by  2 t . If 
firm 1 buys firm 2 and shuts it down at time 0 then firms 1 and 3 coexist until demand declines 
to the point where firm 1 must exit – denote this period by  1 t . Using similar steps to those in the 
duopoly case the two firms’ values can be computed as follows: 
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where . 2 , 1 = i  Again, following steps similar to those in the duopoly case,  2 1 V V >  if 
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where ) ( 3 1 1 K K f a P + − =  (P(0) when 1 and 3 are duopolists);  ) ( 2 1 2 K K f a P + − =  (P(0) 
when 2 and 3 are duopolists); and  ) ( 3 2 1 0 K K K f a P + + − =  (P(0) when all three firms are in 
the market). 
Clearly, expression (16) is directly comparable to expression (11) obtained in the duopoly 
case, so the results obtained for the duopoly case apply to this case. For the sake of brevity we 
have not presented a variety of other cases with different future paths (for example, instead of 
exiting at  1 t  firm 1 might prefer to buy firm 3 and shut it down), but note that even in the other 
cases the Vi terms in expression (15) are part of each firm’s value, if not the entire value. 
Therefore, any factors that make expression (16) more likely to hold contribute towards making 
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Table 1a: Decline in Output in the No-Merger Group 
SIC 
Code 




Total Rate of 
Decline as of 1995 
        
2067 Chewing  gum  1979-91  -18.7  -6.1 
2111 Cigarettes  1981-93  -35.4  -11.7 
2141  Tobacco stemming and redrying  1976-86  -41.4  -27.9 
2296  Tire cord and fabrics  1978-93  -49.4  -38.9 
2337 Women’s, misses’, and juniors’ suits and coats  1982-95  -32.9  -32.9 
2371 Fur  goods 1979-95  -89.3  -89.3 
2381  Fabrics dress and work gloves  1978-88  -66.3  -37.5 
2385 Waterproof  outerwear  1976-95  -69.8  -69.8 
2386  Leather and sheep-lined clothing  1975-91  -62.2  -47.8 
2397  Schiffli machine embroideries  1982-95  -34.4  -34.4 
2429  Special products sawmills, nec  1976-92  -82.0  -81.3 
2449 Wood containers, nec  1975-86  -54.4  -49.2 
2517 Wood television and radio cabinets  1978-91  -59.0  -23.3 
2519  Household furniture, nec  1981-91  -29.1  -26.2 
2655  Fiber cans, drums, and similar products  1979-95  -25.6  -25.6 
2675  Die-cut paper and board  1983-92  -19.9  -9.3 
2873 Nitrogenous  fertilizers 1980-86  -29.7  -6.1 
2999  Petroleum and coal products, nec  1981-90  -25.9  -19.4 
3021  Rubber and plastics footwear  1975-87  -35.0  -7.1 
3111  Leather tanning and finishing  1977-86  -43.6  -25.4 
3131  Footwear cut stock  1981-95  -61.9  -61.9 
3142 House  slippers  1980-95  -74.3  -74.3 
3143 Men’s footwear, except athletic  1976-91  -42.1  -38.2 
3151  Leather gloves and mittens 1976-95  -71.6  -71.6 
3161 Luggage  1980-86  -46.6  -37.9 
3172 Personal  leather  goods, nec  1978-95  -58.9  -58.9 
3199 Leather  goods, nec  1976-95  -46.3  -46.3 
3259  Structural clay products, nec  1978-93  -70.0  -62.3 
3262  Vitreous china table and kitchenware  1980-88  -41.3  -21.4 
3263  Semivitreous table and kitchenware  1975-86  -88.3  -83.4 
3291 Abrasive  products  1984-92  -21.7  -13.7 
3292 Asbestos  products  1975-95  -100.0  -100.0 
3331 Primary  copper 1978-86  -54.7  -6.7 
3355 Aluminum  rolling and drawing, nec  1980-89  -80.8  -60.2 
3366 Copper foundries  1981-91  -31.2  -29.2 
3411 Metal  cans  1977-86  -15.2  -8.3 
3412  Metal barrels, drums, and pails  1979-86  -45.8  -40.3 
3433  Heating equipment, except electric  1980-91  -32.6  -20.9 
3498  Fabricated pipe and fittings 1979-87  -49.1  -7.6 
3534  Elevators and moving stairways  1985-92  -27.1  -17.2 
3536  Hoists, cranes, and monorails 1981-87  -54.9  -34.7 
3553 Woodworking machinery  1975-91  -50.6  -18.5 
3634  Electric housewares and fans  1980-92  -32.1  -22.1 
3676 Electronic  resistors  1984-94  -44.9  -39.6 
3873  Watches, clocks, watchcases, and parts  1978-95  -73.7  -73.7 
3951  Pens and mechanical pencils  1981-86  -32.3  -21.7 
3965  Fasteners, buttons, needles, and pins  1977-89  -41.7  -34.8 
        
Avg.     (length) 
11.9 
-48.8 -37.8 











Table 1b. Decline in Output in the Merger Group 
SIC 
Code 
Description Period  of 
Decline 
Total Rate of 
Decline 
Total Rate of Decline 
as of 1995 
        
2051  Bread, cake, and related products  1976-93  -18.6  -18.1 
2062  Cane sugar refining  1976-95  -49.8  -49.8 
2079  Edible fats and oils, nec  1979-95  -40.7  -40.7 
2085 Distilled and blended liquors  1980-92 -37.4  -36.2 
2091  Canned and cured fish and seafoods  1981-86 -77.8  -75.3 
2095 Roasted  coffee  1985-95  -29.2  -29.2 
2121 Cigars  1975-89  -62.5  -49.7 
2221  Broadwoven fabrics mills, manmade fiber, silk  1983-91 -21.9  -7.1 
2311 Men’s and boys’ suits and coats  1977-95  -61.8  -61.8 
2325 Men’s and boys’ trousers and slacks   1983-90  -18.1  -0.4 
2331 Women’s, misses’, and juniors’ blouses and 
shirts 
1982-89 -32.4  -32.3 
2341 Women’s and children’s underwear  1980-93  -37.4  -28.8 
2652 Setup  paperboard  boxes  1976-93 -53.2  -40.3 
2656 Sanitary  food containers  1976-95 -34.6  -34.6 
2823  Cellulosic manmade fibers  1979-94  -49.2  -48.9 
2892 Explosives  1975-95  -49.4  -49.4 
3052  Rubber and plastics hose and belting 1979-91  -38.0  -19.5 
3144 Women’s footwear, except athletic  1976-95  -72.4  -72.4 
3149  Footwear, except rubber, nec  1980-91  -76.9  -68.5 
3171 Women’s handbags and purses  1978-95  -73.2  -73.2 
3221 Glass  containers  1977-95  -44.3  -44.3 
3241 Cement,  hydraulic  1978-91 -27.1  -14.1 
3255 Clay  refractories  1978-93  -50.9  -38.7 
3312  Blast furnaces and steel mills  1979-86 -49.5  -33.3 
3321  Gray and ductile iron foundries  1978-91 -47.3  -31.5 
3322  Malleable iron foundries  1976-92  -78.4  -75.0 
3325  Steel foundries, nec  1979-86  -67.7  -51.5 
3334 Primary  aluminum  1979-86  -41.4  -33.2 
3339 Primary  nonferrous metals, nec  1980-92 -46.5  -41.7 
3356 Nonferrous  rolling and drawing, nec  1977-92  -44.8  -34.1 
3441  Fabricated structural metal  1980-92  -21.7  -10.5 
3443  Fabricated plate work (boiler shops)  1979-86 -48.2  -27.9 
3463 Nonferrous  forgings  1980-91  -44.4  -17.0 
3484 Small  arms  1976-91  -47.5  -41.4 
3489  Ordnance and accessories, nec  1984-94  -50.6  -41.7 
3493  Steel springs, except wire  1978-86  -41.1  -25.7 
3494  Valves and pipe fittings, nec  1981-92 -43.8  -37.9 
3511  Turbines and turbine generator sets  1976-86  -38.3  -17.8 
3523  Farm machinery and equipment  1979-87  -64.0  -42.9 
3532 Mining  machinery  1975-92  -63.1  -51.6 
3533  Oil and gas field machinery  1981-87  -77.9  -74.4 
3541  Machine tools, metal cutting types  1981-91  -59.9  -55.7 
3542  Machine tools, metal forming types  1975-92  -51.5  -37.1 
3556 Food products machinery  1978-86 -36.8  -21.4 
3579  Office machines, nec  1985-91  -46.5  -32.8 
3592  Carburetors, pistons, rings, and valves  1984-91  -45.4  -22.9 
3594  Fluid power pumps and motors  1981-93  -31.7  -22.5 
3613  Switchgear and switchboard apparatus  1979-91 -27.5  -13.9 
3641  Electric lamp bulbs and tubes  1979-95  -21.7  -21.7 
3644  Noncurrent-carrying wiring devices  1979-91  -27.6  -10.2 
3645  Residentail lighting fixtures  1978-91  -34.9  -18.8 
3671 Electron  tubes  1980-91  -34.1  -10.2 
3731  Ship building and repairing  1981-95  -43.1  -43.1 
3795  Tanks and tank components  1985-95 -69.9  -69.9 
3931 Musical  instruments  1976-89  -52.4  -47.0 
3942  Dolls and stuffed toys  1984-95  -67.4  -67.4 
3944  Games, toys, and children’s vehicles  1981-90  -37.1  -19.2 
        
Avg.   (length) 
12.2 
-46.7 -37.5 












Rate of change 
        
2067  Chewing gum  14  Not available   
2111 Cigarettes  8  8  0.0 
2141  Tobacco stemming and redrying  38  32  -15.8 
2296  Tire cord and fabrics  8  12  50.0 
2337 Women’s, misses’, and juniors’ suits and coats  1558  1009  -35.2 
2371 Fur  goods 620  211  -66.0 
2381  Fabrics dress and work gloves  100  59  -41.0 
2385 Waterproof  outerwear  157  61  -61.1 
2386  Leather and sheep-lined clothing  236  115  -51.3 
2397  Schiffli machine embroideries  357  220  -38.4 
2429  Special products sawmills, nec  522  181  -65.3 
2449 Wood containers, nec  238  217  -8.8 
2517 Wood television and radio cabinets  91  104  14.3 
2519  Household furniture, nec  198  197  -0.5 
2655  Fiber cans, drums, and similar products  166  153  -7.8 
2675  Die-cut paper and board  316  356  12.7 
2873 Nitrogenous  fertilizers 110  103  -6.4 
2999  Petroleum and coal products, nec  60  70  16.7 
3021  Rubber and plastics footwear  67  53  -20.9 
3111  Leather tanning and finishing  428  297  -30.6 
3131  Footwear cut stock  174  94  -46.0 
3142 House  slippers  65  28  -56.9 
3143 Men’s footwear, except athletic  115  108  -6.1 
3151  Leather gloves and mittens 84  55  -34.5 
3161 Luggage  286  285  -0.3 
3172 Personal  leather  goods, nec  253  190  -24.9 
3199 Leather  goods, nec  512  428  -16.4 
3259  Structural clay products, nec  94  60  -36.2 
3262  Vitreous china table and kitchenware  26  35  34.6 
3263  Semivitreous table and kitchenware  22  28  27.3 
3291 Abrasive  products  353  367  4.0 
3292 Asbestos  products  86  12  -86.0 
3331 Primary  copper 8  11  37.5 
3355 Aluminum  rolling and drawing, nec  18  27  50.0 
3366 Copper foundries  476  324  -31.9 
3411 Metal  cans  153  132  -13.7 
3412  Metal barrels, drums, and pails  120  116  -3.3 
3433  Heating equipment, except electric  678  406  -40.1 
3498  Fabricated pipe and fittings 513  815  58.9 
3534  Elevators and moving stairways  134  162  20.9 
3536  Hoists, cranes, and monorails 231  171  -26.0 
3553 Woodworking machinery  291  278  -4.5 
3634  Electric housewares and fans  239  189  -20.9 
3676 Electronic  resistors  77  87  13.0 
3873  Watches, clocks, watchcases, and parts  283  179  -36.7 
3951  Pens and mechanical pencils  133  104  -21.8 
3965  Fasteners, buttons, needles, and pins  249  221  -11.2 
        
Avg.     235.1  182.0  -14.0 












Table 2b. Firm Numbers in the Merger Group 
SIC 
Code 




Rate of change 
        
2051  Bread, cake, and related products  2549  2180  -14.5 
2062  Cane sugar refining  27  12  -55.6 
2079  Edible fats and oils, nec  66  72  9.1 
2085 Distilled and blended liquors  64  43  -32.8 
2091  Canned and cured fish and seafoods  215 144  -33.0 
2095 Roasted  coffee  133  134  0.8 
2121 Cigars  94  25  -73.4 
2221  Broadwoven fabrics mills, manmade fiber and 
silk 
267 321  20.2 
2311 Men’s and boys’ suits and coats  619  249  -59.8 
2325 Men’s and boys’ trousers and slacks   347  278  -19.9 
2331 Women’s, misses’, and juniors’ blouses and 
shirts 
1292 1411  9.2 
2341 Women’s and children’s underwear  548  264  -51.8 
2652 Setup  paperboard  boxes  280 146  -47.9 
2656 Sanitary  food containers  122 46  -62.3 
2823  Cellulosic manmade fibers  5  5  0.0 
2892 Explosives  63  65  3.2 
3052  Rubber and plastics hose and belting 101  146  44.6 
3144 Women’s footwear, except athletic  243  99  -59.3 
3149  Footwear, except rubber, nec  159  84  -47.2 
3171 Women’s handbags and purses  404  205  -49.3 
3221 Glass  containers  31  16  -48.4 
3241 Cement,  hydraulic 87  122 40.2 
3255 Clay  refractories  98  95  -3.1 
3312  Blast furnaces and steel mills  395 135  -65.8 
3321  Gray and ductile iron foundries  865 641  -25.9 
3322  Malleable iron foundries  58  24  -58.6 
3325  Steel foundries, nec  287  271  -5.6 
3334 Primary  aluminum  12  30  150.0 
3339 Primary  nonferrous metals, nec  81  102 25.9 
3356 Nonferrous  rolling and drawing, nec  153  161  5.2 
3441  Fabricated structural metal  2319  2438  5.1 
3443  Fabricated plate work (boiler shops)  1683 1801  7.0 
3463 Nonferrous  forgings  43  72  67.4 
3484 Small  arms  105  177  68.6 
3489  Ordnance and accessories, nec  89  71  -20.2 
3493  Steel springs, except wire  116  107  -7.8 
3494  Valves and pipe fittings, nec  741 226  -69.5 
3511  Turbines and turbine generator sets  68  64  -5.9 
3523  Farm machinery and equipment  1868  1578  -15.5 
3532 Mining  machinery  293  268  -8.5 
3533  Oil and gas field machinery  386  474  22.8 
3541  Machine tools, metal cutting types  874  394  -54.9 
3542  Machine tools, metal forming types  411  212  -48.4 
3556 Food products machinery  685 498  -27.3 
3579  Office machines, nec  191  143  -25.1 
3592  Carburetors, pistons, rings, and valves  131  116  -11.5 
3594  Fluid power pumps and motors  515  158  -69.3 
3613  Switchgear and switchboard apparatus  542 439  -19.0 
3641  Electric lamp bulbs and tubes  128  76  -40.6 
3644  Noncurrent-carrying wiring devices  174  177  1.7 
3645  Residentail lighting fixtures  675  511  -24.3 
3671 Electron  tubes  125  174  39.2 
3731  Ship building and repairing  542  562  3.7 
3795  Tanks and tank components 20  37  85.0 
3931 Musical  instruments  400  437  9.3 
3942  Dolls and stuffed toys  223  204  -8.5 
3944  Games, toys, and children’s vehicles  754  894  18.6 
        
Avg.   402.6  348.0  -8.7 





Table 3a: Concentration in 1977 in the No-Merger Group 
SIC 
Code 
Description  CR4 CR8 CR20  CR50 
        
2067  Chewing  gum  93 99 100  100 
2111  Cigarettes  50  100 100 100 
2141  Tobacco stemming and redrying  67  85  98  100 
2296  Tire cord and fabrics  80  100  100  100 
2337 Women’s, misses’, and juniors’ suits and coats  15  20  31  45 
2371  Fur  goods  11 19 31 51 
2381  Fabrics dress and work gloves  44  63  82  96 
2385  Waterproof  outerwear  41 52 70 90 
2386  Leather and sheep-lined clothing  16  28  50  78 
2397  Schiffli  machine  embroideries  26 36 50 67 
2429  Special products sawmills,  nec  11 19 36 57 
2449 Wood  containers,  nec  25 38 64 87 
2517 Wood television and radio cabinets  45  75  88  98 
2519  Household  furniture,  nec  39 51 73 90 
2655  Fiber cans, drums, and similar products  54  73  85  94 
2675  Die-cut paper and board  43  55  71  85 
2873 Nitrogenous  fertilizers  34 54 82 99 
2999  Petroleum and coal products, nec  67  84  94  99 
3021  Rubber and plastics footwear  58  73  95  99 
3111  Leather tanning and finishing  17  28  51  76 
3131  Footwear  cut  stock  21 32 55 83 
3142  House  slippers  44 64 87 99 
3143 Men’s footwear, except athletic  31  46  73  95 
3151  Leather gloves and mittens  38 54 79 97 
3161  Luggage  40 50 66 85 
3172 Personal  leather  goods,  nec  38 49 67 86 
3199 Leather  goods,  nec  13 24 44 65 
3259  Structural clay products, nec  40  60  85  97 
3262  Vitreous china table and kitchenware  71  94  99  100 
3263  Semivitreous table and kitchenware  68  75  96  100 
3291  Abrasive  products  58 65 77 87 
3292  Asbestos  products  42 64 90 98 
3331 Primary  copper  87  100 100 100 
3355 Aluminum  rolling and drawing, nec  81  95  100  100 
3366 Copper  foundries  16 23 37 57 
3411  Metal  cans  59 74 90 98 
3412  Metal barrels, drums, and pails  34  47  71  94 
3433  Heating equipment, except electric  14  26  44  69 
3498  Fabricated pipe and fittings  18 29 49 70 
3534  Elevators and moving stairways  52  68  82  94 
3536  Hoists, cranes, and monorails  16 30 57 80 
3553 Woodworking  machinery  35 46 62 80 
3634  Electric housewares and fans  46  59  78  94 
3676  Electronic  resistors  38 63 86 98 
3873  Watches, clocks, watchcases, and parts  58  66  82  94 
3951  Pens and mechanical pencils  50  64  80  94 
3965  Fasteners, buttons, needles, and pins  50  61  73  87 
        
Avg.      42.2 56.9 73.6 87.5 












Table 3b. Concentration in 1977 in the Merger Group 
SIC 
Code 
Description CR4  CR8  CR20  CR50 
        
2051  Bread, cake, and related products  33  40  54  68 
2062  Cane sugar refining  63  90  99  100 
2079  Edible fats and oils, nec  43  63  90  99 
2085 Distilled and blended liquors  52  71  91  99 
2091  Canned and cured fish and seafoods  52  65 79 91 
2095  Roasted  coffee  61  73 89 97 
2121  Cigars  56  79 95 99 
2221  Broadwoven fabrics mills, manmade fiber and silk  42  58  76  90 
2311 Men’s and boys’ suits and coats  21  32  48  67 
2325 Men’s and boys’ trousers and slacks   49  60  73  86 
2331 Women’s, misses’, and juniors’ blouses and shirts  12  18  30  47 
2341 Women’s and children’s  underwear  22  29 43 64 
2652 Setup  paperboard  boxes  12  21 37 58 
2656 Sanitary  food  containers  48  68 87 96 
2823  Cellulosic manmade fibers  80  100  100  100 
2892  Explosives  64  79 96 99 
3052  Rubber and plastics hose and belting  55  71 87 97 
3144 Women’s footwear, except athletic  29  39  56  79 
3149  Footwear, except rubber, nec  24  41  68  91 
3171 Women’s handbags and purses  21  31  48  70 
3221  Glass  containers  54  75 98 100 
3241 Cement,  hydraulic  24  41 74 99 
3255  Clay  refractories  47  67 86 98 
3312  Blast furnaces and steel mills  45  65 84 95 
3321  Gray and ductile iron foundries  34  44  60  73 
3322  Malleable iron foundries  54  72  88  99 
3325  Steel foundries, nec  26  38  56  77 
3334 Primary  aluminum  76  93  100  100 
3339 Primary  nonferrous metals, nec  56  76  96  99 
3356 Nonferrous  rolling and drawing, nec  42  56  79  95 
3441  Fabricated structural metal  10  15  23  35 
3443  Fabricated plate work (boiler shops)  26  32 43 57 
3463  Nonferrous  forgings  77  85 97 100 
3484  Small  arms  58  78 95 99 
3489  Ordnance and accessories,  nec  48  72 91 99 
3493  Steel springs, except wire  44  59  84  97 
3494  Valves and pipe fittings,  nec  13  21 37 59 
3511  Turbines and turbine generator sets  86  97  99  100 
3523  Farm machinery and equipment  46  61  70  78 
3532  Mining  machinery  37  50 70 88 
3533  Oil and gas field machinery  30  45  66  87 
3541  Machine tools, metal cutting  types  22  35 56 77 
3542  Machine tools, metal forming types  18  32  55  77 
3556 Food products machinery  14  24  40  60 
3579  Office machines, nec  60  76  88  98 
3592  Carburetors, pistons, rings, and valves  52  71  92  98 
3594  Fluid power pumps and motors  17  29  52  78 
3613  Switchgear and switchboard  apparatus  51  65 78 88 
3641  Electric lamp bulbs and tubes  90  95  98  99 
3644  Noncurrent-carrying wiring devices  25  39  65  89 
3645  Residentail lighting fixtures  25  33  45  61 
3671  Electron  tubes  58  78 95 99 
3731  Ship building and repairing  43  58  76  88 
3795  Tanks and tank components 87  97  100  100 
3931  Musical  instruments  31  53 78 91 
3942  Dolls and stuffed toys  37  46  66  87 
3944  Games, toys, and children’s  vehicles  34  47 66 82 
        
Avg.   42.6  56.8 73.4 85.9 






















        
2067 Chewing  gum  -.8  0.6  -.39** .13 
2111  Cigarettes  7.8 5.6 -2.22*** -.64** 
2141  Tobacco stemming and redrying  -1.3  -2.2  .25*  .42 
2296  Tire cord and fabrics  -2.7  -2.2  .34*** .46 
2337 Women’s, misses’, and juniors’ suits and 
coats 
-2.4 -2.8 .26  .70 
2371 Fur  goods 4.7  -5.1  -.26*** .16*** 
2381  Fabrics dress and work gloves  -2.1  -0.6  .12*** .096 
2385  Waterproof  outerwear  -2.6 -1.5 .59*  .13 
2386  Leather and sheep-lined clothing  1.4  -5.5  -.14  .018 
2397  Schiffli machine embroideries  .3  -2.1  .008  .31 
2429  Special products sawmills, nec  -3.6  7.3  .39*** -.39** 
2449  Wood containers, nec  -1.5  -1.6  -.015  .14 
2517  Wood television and radio cabinets  -0.8  -2.6  .092**  .28*** 
2519  Household furniture, nec  -0.7  -2.9  .095  -.038 
2655  Fiber cans, drums, and similar products  -0.2  0.9  .024  -.67** 
2675  Die-cut paper and board  -0.2  -1.3  .17  -.10 
2873 Nitrogenous  fertilizers  -4.1 -7.9 .71*  .71 
2999  Petroleum and coal products, nec  -6.6  6.1  .80  -1.10* 
3021  Rubber and plastics footwear  -3.2  -2.1  .056  .17 
3111  Leather tanning and finishing  1.8  2.0  -.98*** -.19** 
3131  Footwear cut stock  0.3  -1.7  -.018  .19*** 
3142  House  slippers  -1.2 -2.8 .26*  .098 
3143 Men’s footwear, except athletic  -0.9  0.0  -.012  -.045 
3151  Leather gloves and mittens 0.7  -0.4  -.037  .067 
3161 Luggage  1.1  -1.8  -.058  .17 
3172  Personal leather goods, nec  -0.8  -1.3  .080  .24* 
3199 Leather  goods, nec  0.2  -0.6  -.085  .059 
3259  Structural clay products, nec  -1.2  -2.4  .15*** .34*** 
3262  Vitreous china table and kitchenware  0.3  0.9  .016  -.055 
3263  Semivitreous table and kitchenware  -0.8  -0.1  .046  -.004 
3291  Abrasive  products  -1.5 -0.2 .074  .17 
3292  Asbestos  products  -0.3 -3.2 .12*  .071 
3331 Primary  copper  -4.7 -4.3 .69  .45 
3355 Aluminum  rolling and drawing, nec  -4.3  2.6  .16*  -.13** 
3366 Copper foundries  -3.2  0.7  .50  -.23 
3411  Metal  cans  -1.3 -1.4 .46*  .55 
3412  Metal barrels, drums, and pails  -2.2  -1.4  .12**  .14 
3433  Heating equipment, except electric  -0.8  -1.2  .18**  .31 
3498  Fabricated pipe and fittings  -0.8 -1.7 .29*** .081** 
3534  Elevators and moving stairways  -1.6  -3.4  .30  .31 
3536  Hoists, cranes, and monorails  -1.5 -1.3 .050 .10 
3553  Woodworking  machinery  -0.2 -1.8 .004  -.034 
3634  Electric housewares and fans  -2.0  -2.5  .52**  .36 
3676 Electronic  resistors  -0.5  1.4  .11  -.30** 
3873  Watches, clocks, watchcases, and parts  -2.2  -1.8  .20*** .14 
3951  Pens and mechanical pencils  -6.1  1.6  .42  -.096 
3965  Fasteners, buttons, needles, and pins  -2.7  -1.8  .60*** .15*** 
        
Avg.      -1.2 -1.0 0.11***  0.078 
S.D.    2.4 2.7    
V(Avg.)      0.0010  0.0010 
 
*, **, ***: Sig. at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels. The null hypothesis in the “early slope” column is that the 
coefficient is equal to zero. The null hypothesis in the “late slope” column is that the coefficient is equal to the 




Table 4b. Price Changes and P-Q Curve Results for the Merger Group 
SIC Code  Description  Early avg. 
rate of price 
change 
Late avg. 
rate of price 
change 
Early slope  Late Slope 
        
2051  Bread, cake, and related products  -1.0  0.5  .73*** -.29*** 
2062  Cane sugar refining  0.6  -1.5  -.068  .65 
2079  Edible fats and oils, nec  -4.1  0.5  .71**  -.041* 
2085 Distilled and blended liquors  -1.2  0.2  .25*  -.21** 
2091  Canned and cured fish and seafoods  -7.3 -1.0 .30  .022 
2095  Roasted  coffee  -1.6 2.6  -.30 -1.23 
2121 Cigars  -3.0  0.0  .47*** -.04*** 
2221  Broadwoven fabrics mills, manmade fiber and silk  -2.0  -2.3  .40*  1.04 
2311 Men’s and boys’ suits and coats  -1.7  -.9  .64***  .14*** 
2325 Men’s and boys’ trousers and slacks   -1.2  -1.8  .24  .34 
2331 Women’s, misses’, and juniors’ blouses and shirts  1.5  -1.8  -.18*  .24** 
2341 Women’s and children’s  underwear  -1.2 -2.1 .39**  .41 
2652 Setup  paperboard  boxes  -0.1 -1.1 -.024 .15* 
2656 Sanitary  food containers  -0.1  .8  .034  -.024 
2823  Cellulosic manmade fibers  .4  -1.7  -.14  .17 
2892  Explosives  0.0 2.6 -.14  -.35 
3052  Rubber and plastics hose and belting -.4  -1.0  -.050  -.012 
3144 Women’s footwear, except athletic  -1.3  -1.3  .38***  .13* 
3149  Footwear, except rubber, nec  -2.9  -.6  .24*** .034** 
3171 Women’s handbags and purses  -.6  -2.1  .055  .24*** 
3221 Glass  containers  .4  -2.0  .047  .59*** 
3241 Cement,  hydraulic  -2.1 -3.7 .39* .57 
3255 Clay  refractories  .8  -1.6  -.19*** .30*** 
3312  Blast furnaces and steel mills  -2.2 -3.4 .11  .71 
3321  Gray and ductile iron foundries  -1.8  -2.8  .21**  .13 
3322  Malleable iron foundries  -2.0  -2.9  .12*** .29** 
3325  Steel foundries, nec  -.5  -2.5  .002  .18 
3334  Primary  aluminum  -1.0 -4.1 .18  .36 
3339  Primary nonferrous metals, nec  -2.1  -2.3  -.34  .64 
3356 Nonferrous  rolling and drawing, nec  -.2  -1.1  -.45  .35 
3441  Fabricated structural metal  -1.9  -2.1  .51*  1.28 
3443  Fabricated plate work (boiler shops)  -1.7 -2.5 .099  .43 
3463 Nonferrous  forgings  1.1  -.5  -.56**  .083* 
3484 Small  arms  2.6  -.9  -.071  .005 
3489  Ordnance and accessories, nec  -2.2  -.2  .26  .078 
3493  Steel springs, except wire  -4.5  -2.6  .36*** .15 
3494  Valves and pipe fittings,  nec  -1.2  1.5 .30 -.072 
3511  Turbines and turbine generator sets  -.7  -.6  .095  .041 
3523  Farm machinery and equipment  .5  -.2  -.040**  .13*** 
3532 Mining  machinery  .7  -1.3  -.021  .27* 
3533  Oil and gas field machinery  -2.0  -3.9  .084  .13 
3541  Machine tools, metal cutting  types  -.6 -.3 .039***  .029 
3542  Machine tools, metal forming types  1.2  -.8  -.11*  .033 
3556 Food products machinery  -.5  .7  .065  -.20* 
3579  Office machines, nec  -2.5  -4.3  .12*  .19 
3592  Carburetors, pistons, rings, and valves  -1.7  -2.5  .13*** .26*** 
3594  Fluid power pumps and motors  -2.1  -1.1  .31**  .15 
3613  Switchgear and switchboard apparatus  .1  -.8  -.03  .14 
3641  Electric lamp bulbs and tubes  -.6  -2.7  .21  .58 
3644  Noncurrent-carrying wiring devices  -.5  0  .064  .27 
3645  Residentail lighting fixtures  -.9  -.8  .21**  .072 
3671 Electron  tubes  1.9  -1.3  -.63*** .24*** 
3731  Ship building and repairing  -1.0  -.3  .12*** .019 
3795  Tanks and tank components 3.1  -.3  -.18*  .16* 
3931 Musical  instruments  -1.6  -.9  .29*** .21 
3942  Dolls and stuffed toys  -3.0  -1.5  .22*** .093** 
3944  Games, toys, and children’s  vehicles  -1.1 -1.7 .12  -.021 
        
Avg.    -1.0 -1.3 0.10***  0.18* 
S.D.    1.7 1.5    
V(Avg.)      0.00070  0.0012  
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